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The Statutory Death of the Gig Economy:
How California Policy Incentivizes the
Automation of Five Million Jobs
HENRY MORENO*
With the advent of the gig economy, many have benefited
from the availability of flexible work, particularly in the
service industry. Since then, whether these workers are
independent contractors or employees—entitled to certain
rights and benefits—has been intensely debated. This Note
examines the different legal approaches used in worker
classification and the ramifications an employee designation
could have on the estimated five million jobs the gig
economy currently supports. Accordingly, this Note
advocates the current state of the law is inept as applied to
the gig economy and examines a potential framework to
align the benefits of the gig economy while protecting
against employee misclassification.
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INTRODUCTION
Just four years after the inception of Uber in 2009,1 giving rise
to what is now known as Transportation Network Companies
(“TNCs”), the fight over driver classification has ensued.2 TNCs operate under a business model that has been coined the “gig economy.”3 Since then, TNCs have continued to vigorously fight to
1

Uber Techs., Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 13 (Apr. 11, 2019).
See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 904 F.3d 1087, 1090–91 (9th Cir. 2018)
(finding Uber’s arbitration agreement with its drivers enforceable, preventing
drivers from certifying as a class in their 2013 alleged state and federal violation
claims resulting from misclassification as independent contractors rather than employees).
3
See John Frazer, How the Gig Economy Is Reshaping Careers for the Next
Generation, FORBES (Feb. 15, 2019, 9:40 PM), https://www.forbes.
com/sites/johnfrazer1/2019/02/15/how-the-gig-economy-is-reshaping-careersfor-the-next-generation/#3afe253349ad. The “gig economy” describes the
2

2021]

THE STATUTORY DEATH OF THE GIG ECONOMY

947

classify drivers as independent contractors while many drivers advocate for employee designation.4 Independent contractors are generally individuals that offer their services for hire but are free from
the control of the hiring party in the manner in which they perform
their work.5 The issue has surfaced internationally and carries huge
financial implications for TNCs in the form of mandated employee
benefits abroad and in the United States.6 Several states have statutorily recognized TNC drivers as independent contractors under
their motor vehicle statutes.7 Today, all states have some form of
motor vehicle TNC regulation on their books, with the exception of
Oregon, which expressly designates drivers as independent contractors, implies an independent contractor relationship, or is silent on
the issue altogether and simply addresses insurance requirements.8
independent business model employed by corporations like Uber, Lyft, and Door
Dash. Id. These business models depend on attracting willing workers to engage
in the service they respectively provide by offering flexibility in scheduling, oversight, and a relatively low level of prerequisite skill. See id. This business model
has allowed many workers to leave otherwise necessary jobs by providing an alternative means of income while these workers pursue other desired career paths.
See id.
4
See Andrew J. Hawkins, Uber Settles Driver Classification Lawsuit for $20
Million, VERGE (Mar. 12, 2019, 11:59 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/12/18261755/uber-driver-classification-lawsuit-settlement-20million; Peter Blumberg & Erin Mulvaney, Uber’s Arch Nemesis on Driver Pay
Sues Before New Law Even Inked, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 13, 2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-13/uber-s-arch-nemesis-ondriver-pay-sues-before-new-law-even-inked.
5
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR DEFINED,
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/independentcontractor-defined (last updated Dec. 3, 2020).
6
See Jacob Passy, Uber Doesn’t Want Its Drivers to Be Employees—Here’s
Why That Matters, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 15, 2019, 7:30 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/uber-doesnt-want-its-drivers-to-be-employees-heres-whythat-matters-2017-11-13; see also Sam Schechner, Uber Drivers Entitled to
Workers Rights Including Minimum Wage, U.K. Supreme Court Rules, WALL ST.
J (Feb. 19, 2021, 5:55 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-faces-setback-asu-k-court-rules-drivers-are-entitled-to-worker-rights11613729882?st=flktym4x6fnh7vn&reflink=article_email_share.
7
See Eduardo Munoz, Three US States Have Already Blessed Uber’s Independent Contractor Employment Model, QUARTZ (Dec. 10, 2015),
https://qz.com/571249/three-us-states-have-already-blessed-ubers-independentcontractor-employment-model/.
8
See infra Part II.D.2.
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The National Labor Relations Board (the “NLRB”) has also provided input on the issue, determining drivers to be independent contractors by applying a version of the common-law agency test.9
One of the most significant threats to Uber’s independent contractor business model came in September of 2019 when the California legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 5 (“AB 5”), which codified the California Supreme Court’s decision in Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court.10 The effect of AB 5 is to place the burden on employers to demonstrate that their workers are not employees under the “ABC” test.11 As of November 2020, TNCs prevailed
on Proposition 22, a California ballot measure exempting them from
AB 5.12 Prior to AB 5’s passage, however, TNCs came to the table
with a rejected $21 per hour offer as long as they could maintain an
independent contractor relationship.13
9
Advice Memorandum from Jayme L. Sophir, Assoc. Gen. Couns. Div. of
Advice, Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd., to Jill Coffman, Reg’l Dir. Region 20, Nat’l Lab.
Rels. Bd. (Apr. 16, 2019) [hereinafter NLRB Advice Memorandum],
https://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-CA-163062.
10
See generally Assemb. B. 5, 2019–20 Sess. § 1 (Cal. 2019); Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 35–42 (Cal. 2018). In Dynamex, the
California Supreme Court applied a three-part “ABC” test and determined a delivery company’s drivers could be legally classified as employees for the commonality inquiry under class certification. Id. The three-part test consisted of: (A)
whether the worker was free from control and direction of the hiring entity in the
performance of the work, both under the contract for the performance of the work
and in fact; (B) whether the worker performs work outside the usual course of the
hiring entity’s business; and (C) whether the worker is customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as the
work performed for the hiring entity. Id.
11
See Carolyn Said, AB5 Gig Work Bill: All Your Questions Answered, S.F.
CHRON. (Feb. 26, 2020, 3:10 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/AB5-gig-work-bill-All-your-questions-answered-14441764.php.
12
See LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF., PROPOSITION 22 EXEMPTS APP-BASED
TRANSPORTATION FROM PROVIDING EMPLOYEE BENEFITS TO CERTAIN DRIVERS,
at 1 (2020), https://lao.ca.gov/BallotAnalysis/Proposition?number=22&year
=2020.
13
Preetika Rana, California Voters Exempt Uber, Lyft, DoorDash from Reclassifying Drivers, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 4, 2020, 7:29 AM) [hereinafter Rana, Reclassifying Drivers], https://www.wsj.com/articles/california-voters-exemptuber-lyft-doordash-from-having-to-reclassify-drivers-11604476276?st=
uvuof3hifxf5pak&reflink=article_email_share; Cyrus Farivar, ‘Gaming the System’ – Uber and Lyft Face a Driver Reckoning in California, NBC NEWS (June
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The $21 per hour offer comes as no surprise as the cost of classifying drivers as employees in California alone is estimated to be
$500 million per year for Uber and $290 million per year for Lyft.14
Lyft, already operating at nearly a $1 billion net loss in 2018,15 has
acknowledged the extreme financial burden it would endure based
on an employee designation, and many have suggested Lyft will
likely not see a profit for years to come.16 Lyft has also raised the
fact that many part-time drivers would no longer benefit from extra
income simply because Lyft would be forced to create driving
schedules under an employee model that would likely conflict with
other full-time employment.17 Although Proposition 22 shields
TNCs in California for the time being, a look at AB 5’s effect on the
gig economy nationwide is warranted, especially as the economy
recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic.
Part I of this Note will begin with a look at the limited empirical
data available that places into perspective driver demographics,
complaints, pay, and expenses. In Part II, this Note will discuss the
TNC driver relationship as analyzed under the common-law agency
test, the Dynamex “ABC” test, and the “entrepreneurial opportunity”
approach utilized by the NLRB in determining employment relationships. It will also provide an overview of legislation passed in
each state on TNC liability. In Part III, this Note turns to an overview of some state and federally mandated employee benefits and
2, 2019, 5:35 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/gaming-systemuber-lyft-face-driver-reckoning-california-n1012376; see also Alexandria Sage,
California Senate Passes Bill to Tighten ‘Gig’ Worker Rule, REUTERS (Sept. 11,
2019, 2:45 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-employment-california/california-senate-passes-bill-to-tighten-gig-worker-rule-idUSKCN1VW0M7.
14
Marco della Cava, Uber Drivers and Other Gig Workers in California
Could See Improved Lifestyle Under Proposed Law, USA TODAY (July 18, 2019,
8:16 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/07/17/lyft-uberdrivers-center-california-employment-bill/1715578001/.
15
Lyft, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 73 (Mar. 1, 2019).
16
Johana Bhuiyan, If Lyft Can’t Keep its Drivers as Independent Contractors, It May Never Be Profitable, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2019, 5:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-lyft-ipo-drivers20190309-story.html.
17
Alejandro Lazo & Eliot Brown, Uber, Lyft Poised to Lose Fight Against
California Bill to Label Drivers Employees, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 9, 2019, 8:42 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-lyft-poised-to-lose-fight-against-californiabill-to-label-drivers-employees-11568069041.
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the associated costs of such benefits. TNC costs for these benefits
are illustrated through a look at the Ford Motor Company and estimates by the Department of Labor.
Part IV of this Note explores the response TNCs will take from
a proactive stance in order to minimize the financial exposure of
employee benefits by aiming to eliminate the need for drivers—
most significantly, the research and development of autonomous vehicle capability. Part IV will also glance at how the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated the tensions between TNCs, drivers, and
State Legislators. This Note concludes that the current state of
agency law is inapt for gig economy18 application and should incorporate, what the author has termed, the “pragmatic effect” approach
to driver classification. This approach will enable true gig economy
corporations to operate and provide workers the capability to earn
supplemental income and minimize incentives to reduce costs, or
ultimately, the workforce itself, through automation. The “pragmatic effect” principle looks at (1) whether the industry necessarily
depends on an independent contractor status at its finding and (2)
whether an employee designation would essentially destroy the industry and disincentivize future endeavors in the gig economy.
Without a look towards the practical consequences of designating TNC drivers as employees, the ridesharing business model is
certain to disappear along with the five million jobs it has created.19
As later discussed in further detail, if all TNC drivers were designated as employees, Uber and Lyft would incur a $23 billion and $6
billion employee expense, respectively.20 This expense would represent more than double Uber’s 2018 $11 billion revenue and almost
three times Lyft’s 2018 $2.2 billion revenue.21
I.
SUMMARY OF THE LYFT & UBER DRIVER 2019 SURVEY
A significant obstacle in the TNC driver debate is the lack of
empirical data available. A look at the limited available data seems
18

See Frazer, supra note 3.
See Uber Techs., Inc., supra note 1, at 5 (reporting 3.9 million Drivers on
the Uber platform as of December 2018); Lyft, Inc., supra note 15, at 2 (reporting
1.1 million Drivers on the Lyft platform as of December 2018).
20
See infra Part III.B.
21
See id.
19
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to undermine the frequent argument that more TNC drivers are turning to ridesharing as full-time employment and should be treated
like traditional employees.22 Uber and Lyft have a combined five
million drivers on their network as reported in their S-1 filings.23
The latest internal study conducted by Uber on driver demographics
was released in 2015.24 The Uber study was limited in sample size
and only consisted of 833 driver interviews.25 Uber reports that 50%
of its drivers drive less than ten hours per week.26 While the Uber
report did not capture driver age, an independent 2016 survey reported that 26% of Uber’s drivers were over fifty-years-old.27 Similarly, Lyft, with much more recent data, reported that 23% of its
drivers are over the age of fifty.28 Lyft reports that 90% of its drivers
work less than twenty hours per week.29 The Lyft study relied on
responses from 166,540 drivers.30
Between August and September 2019, nearly 70,000 e-mail surveys were sent out to subscribers of The Rideshare Guy.31 The email surveys generated 948 responses and the following results are
based on 947 of these responses.32 Of those taking the survey, 911
answered that the most important thing to them as a driver was pay

22

See della Cava, supra note 14.
See Uber Techs., Inc., supra note 1, at 5; Lyft, Inc., supra note 15, at 2.
24
New Survey: Drivers Choose Uber for its Flexibility and Convenience,
UBER (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.uber.com/newsroom/driver-partner-survey/.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Mike Sonders, These Latest Uber Statistics Show How It’s Dominating
Lyft, SURVEYMONKEY INTEL. (Dec. 7, 2016), https://medium.com/@sm_app_intel/these-latest-uber-statistics-show-how-its-dominating-lyft-53f6b255de5e.
28
2020 Economic Impact Report: Drivers, LYFT, https://www.lyftimpact.com/stats/national [https://web.archive.org/web/20200604103203/https://
www.lyftimpact.com/stats/national] (last visited May 15, 2021).
29
Id.
30
LYFT POL’Y RSCH, ECONOMIC IMPACT REPORT, 2020 METHODOLOGICAL
SUPPLEMENT 3 (2020).
31
See HARRY CAMPBELL, THE RIDESHARE GUY 2019 READER SURVEY 1, 3
(2019). The Rideshare Guy consists of a blog, YouTube channel and podcast utilized by the rideshare community since 2013 and is self-described as one of the
largest third-party independent sources of rideshare information. See RIDESHARE
GUY, https://therideshareguy.com/ (last visited May 15, 2021).
32
CAMPBELL, supra note 31, at 3, 13. One response was determined to be a
duplicate and not every response answered each survey question. Id at 13.
23
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(52.9%), followed by flexibility (36.7%).33 The remaining 10.4% of
responses consisted of safety, company culture, and pay, followed
by employee benefits.34 Approximately 55.2% of drivers considered
themselves part-time, while a surprising 72.4% of drivers reported
their age to be between 51 and 71 years old.35 An additional 16.7%
reported they fell within the 41 to 50 age group.36 Only 10.9% reported they fell within the 18 to 40 age group.37
From 911 responses, drivers indicated that 19.8% have only
signed up for one ride-sharing service, while 76.6% have signed up
for two or more.38 50.8% of drivers reported primarily driving for
Uber, followed by 19.9% for Lyft and another 22.9% indicated they
drive for Uber and Lyft equally.39
Only 463 responses were received for questions about pay with
Uber.40 36.1% of Uber drivers reported earning between $20 and
$29.99 per hour, before expenses.41 21% of Uber drivers reported
earning $10 to $14.99 per hour while another 26.1% reported $15 to
$19.99 per hour.42 Uber drivers reported an hourly cost of $6.26 per
hour due to vehicle expenses.43 On average and after expenses, Uber
drivers reported pay of $13.47 per hour,44 while Lyft drivers reported $11.55 per hour.45 Interestingly, a 2020 survey revealed that
even during the middle of the pandemic, a majority of drivers (71%)
reported they wanted to remain independent contractors.46
33

Id. at 4.
Id.
35
Id. at 4, 11.
36
Id. at 11.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 8.
39
Id. at 7.
40
Id. at 5.
41
Id.
42
Id. From 181 responses, 25.4% of Lyft drivers reported they earned $20 to
$29.99 per hour and 28.7% reported they earned $10 to $14.99 per hour before
expenses. Id. at 6.
43
Id. at 5.
44
Id. This represents a 17% pay increase from the results of the 2018 survey
conducted. See id.
45
Id.
46
Harry Campbell, Everything You Should Know About AB5 & Its Impact on
Uber, RIDESHARE GUY (Oct. 7, 2020), https://therideshareguy.com/ab5-end-of34
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The results indicate that a majority of survey respondents are at
or near retirement age (according to the The Ride Share Guy survey)
or are university age (according to the Uber and Lyft disclosures)
and driving part-time. A primary concern for drivers is pay, followed by flexibility in the work schedule which makes sense in the
context of both the retiree and college student. Additionally, employee benefits are of low concern, at least to the surveyed group.
This also makes sense for the retired group as they are likely drawing benefits from other sources like traditional employment avenues
and for the college-aged group which may still be receiving health
benefits through their parents or school. The reported after-expenses
pay further suggests that a majority of drivers are seeking supplementary rather than primary income from their driving activity.
If similar results were observed in a more comprehensive and
statistically significant survey, the results would strongly undercut
the argument that ridesharing is a primary source of income for most
drivers. Many may assume that a majority of drivers are at the
younger end of the workforce or rely on ridesharing as a primary
means of income. Even though this may be the case in some instances, it does not appear to represent a majority of rideshare drivers who responded to the survey. The gig economy in this context
appears to primarily enable retirees and college students to supplement their income without a need for additional employee benefits.
The threat of losing work flexibility and supplemental income in exchange for traditional employee benefits may explain why a majority of drivers wish to remain independent contractors, even during
the COVID-19 pandemic.47 With this limited data in mind, this Note
now turns to a discussion of the law as it relates to the various approaches found within the employee versus independent contractor
debate.
II.
THE COMPETING RELATIONSHIP TESTS
Determining whether an independent contractor or employee relationship exists differs not just amongst the several states but also
rideshare/. The survey results were based on 734 responses and revealed a prepandemic-survey of the same question. Id. The pre-pandemic-survey revealed
81% of respondents favored independent contractor status. Id.
47
See id.
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amongst several agencies involved in employee benefits.48 Even
though some elements of the tests are in common agreement, a much
more significant similarity is that the analysis requires a fact-intensive inquiry.49 Courts and commentators have acknowledged that
this fact-intensive inquiry leads to opposite conclusions on similar
fact patterns.50
At the outset, it is important to highlight a legal distinction
adopted by some jurisdictions, including California, when determining a worker’s status.51 When the classification is pertinent to the
issue of liability, the common-law agency test, as articulated by the
Second Restatement of Agency in section 220 (“Restatement

48

See U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., WAGE & HOUR DIV., FACT SHEET #13:
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FSLA)
(2008)
[hereinafter
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
LAB.
FACT
SHEET],
https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs13.htm (expressly stating the
employer-employee relationship is not “determined by the common law standards
relating to master and servant”); Easton Saltsman, Comment, A Free Market Approach to the Rideshare Industry and Worker Classification: The Consequences
of Employee Status and a Proposed Alternative, 13 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 209, 211–
12 (2017).
49
See NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968) (noting
facts of relationship were necessary to establish in applying common-law agency
test); Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 7–9 (Cal. 2018)
(noting specifically what attire drivers were required to wear, what cellular phone
drivers were required to obtain to perform on-demand work, and other delivery
restrictions); Cantor v. Cochran¸184 So. 2d 173, 174 (Fla. 1966) (noting that an
employer-employee relationship does not merely rest on the contractual agreement but rather “upon all the circumstances of their dealings with each other”).
50
Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 14 (“Few problems in the law have given greater
variety of application and conflict in results than the cases arising in the borderland between what is clearly an employer-employee relationship and what is
clearly one of independent, entrepreneurial dealing.” (citing NLRB v. Hearst
Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 121 (1994))); Richard B. Keeton, An Uber Dilemma:
The Conflict Between the Seattle Rideshare Ordinance, the NLRA, and For-Hire
Driver Worker Classification, 52 GONZ. L. REV. 207, 216 (2017); Benjamin Powell, Identity Crisis: The Misclassification of California Uber Drivers, 50 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 459, 468–69 (2017); Mark Macmurdo, Comment, Hold the Phone!
“Peer-To-Peer” Ridesharing Services, Regulation, and Liability, 76 LA. L. REV.
307, 328 (2015).
51
See infra Part II.A.
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§220”), is generally utilized by courts.52 On the other hand, when
the classification bears on the question of whether a worker is entitled to some sort of benefit grounded in a statutory right, a much
more liberal framework applies in some jurisdictions.53
This Part will examine the competing analyses among two states
and one federal agency, followed by a look at how these entities
have specifically resolved or addressed the issue as to TNCs and
their drivers. In doing so, this Part will first discuss California’s approach, then Florida’s, and end with an examination of the NLRB’s
analysis on TNC driver employment status. This analysis is not done
with an eye towards determining which classification is correct or
should be utilized. Rather, it is to demonstrate that these classifications depend not just on the common-law agency test but, more importantly, on distinct jurisdictional guiding principles which have
not aptly developed to handle the gig economy.
A.

The California Approach and Liberal Public Policy Model
In its most recent significant decision pertaining to independent contractor and employee designation—and giving rise to
AB 5—the California Supreme Court engaged in a lengthy discussion of the history and purpose of its “suffer or permit to work

52

Florida has also applied the Restatement §220 to determine that a wholesale grocery store’s merchandise loader, who only received tips as compensation
from customers, was an independent contractor rather than an employee for purposes of Workers’ Compensation. See Cantor, 184 So. 2d at 174–75. The factors
under the Restatement §220 include: (i) extent of control, by the agreement, the
master may exercise over the details of the work; (ii) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (iii) whether the work is
done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision;
(iv) the required skill; (v) the supplier of tools or instrumentalities utilized; (vi)
the length of the employment; (vii) the method of payment; (viii) whether the
work is part of the regular business of the employer; (ix) whether the belief of a
master-servant relationship exists; and (x) whether the principal is or is not in
business. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. L. INST. 1958); Cantor, 184 So. 2d at 174–75; see also Miami-Dade Cty v. State Dep’t of Labor and
Emp’t Sec., 749 So. 2d 574, 577 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (noting the applicability of Cantor and the Restatement §220 but reversing employment designation by
the Unemployment Board on grounds that county poll workers were “public officers” and therefore statutorily exempt).
53
See infra Part II.A.
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standard,” before tempering the standard with the “ABC” test.54 The
Dynamex court was faced with determining whether sufficient commonality in interest existed to justify class certification of drivers
who alleged that Dynamex mischaracterized them as independent
contractors and denied them employee benefits under California’s
Labor Code.55 The relevant provisions of the Labor Code defined
“employ” to mean “to engage, suffer, or permit to work”; “employee” to mean “any person employed by an employer”; and “employer” to mean any entity that “directly or indirectly, or through an
agent or any other person, employs or exercises control over the
wages, hours, or working conditions of any person.”56
Dynamex previously classified its drivers as employees until a
2004 policy change reclassified the drivers as independent contractors.57 Subsequently, Dynamex entered into contracts with its drivers declaring them as such.58 The drivers continued to perform the
same duties as they did prior to the 2004 policy change, making fulfillment deliveries between private customers and large businesses
like Office Depot and Home Depot.59 Drivers were paid by either a
flat fee or a percentage of the delivery fee and could set their own
schedules but would have to notify Dynamex of when they planned
to work.60 Drivers made deliveries using their own vehicles, were
required to wear Dynamex shirts, and utilized Dynamex equipment
purchased with their own funds.61
The Dynamex court had to determine which test would apply to
the employment classification under either the Borello or Martinez
framework.62 Dynamex urged the court to apply the Borello framework while contending that Martinez was inapplicable.63 Both of
these standards will be discussed in turn.
54

See Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 35.
Id. at 5.
56
Id. at 13 (quoting CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11090, subdiv. 2(D)–(F)).
57
Id. at 6.
58
Id.
59
See id. at 8.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 25 (first citing Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259 (Cal. 2010); and
then citing S.G. Borello & Sons v. Dep’t of Indus. Rels., 769 P.2d 399 (Cal.
1989)).
63
Id. at 25–26.
55
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Recognizing its previous precedent applying the Restatement
§220 in the context of social welfare benefits,64 the Dynamex court
presented justifications for departing from those Restatement §220
factors as articulated in its decision in S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v.
Department of Industrial Relations:
[F]ederal courts have long recognized that the distinction between tort policy and social-legislation
policy justifies departures from common law principles when claims arise that one is excluded as an independent contractor from a statute protecting “employees” and that “a number of state courts have
agreed that in worker’s compensation cases, the employee-independent contractor issue cannot be decided absent consideration of the remedial statutory
purpose.”65
The “remedial statutory purpose” analysis was further supplemented by six factors the Borello court adopted from other jurisdictions—which closely resemble the Restatement §220 factors66—applying a similar framework in deciding employment classification
in the context of statutory benefits.67
The Borello court noted that the workers’ compensation statute
at issue served the purposes of (1) ensuring industrial injuries would
be part of the cost of goods rather than a societal burden, (2) guaranteeing limited compensation to injured employees, (3) incentivizing increased safety standards, and (4) insulating employers from

64

Id. at 14–15 (first citing Tieberg v. Unemployment Ins. App. Bd., 471 P.2d,
975, 979 (Cal. 1970); and then citing Empire Star Mines Co. v. Cal. Emp.
Comm’n, 168 P.2d 686, 692 (Cal. 1946)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 220 (AM. L. INST. 1958).
65
Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 16 (citation omitted) (quoting Borello, 769 P.2d at
405).
66
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. L. INST. 1958).
67
See Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 18 n.12. These factors include: (i) the right to
control the worker; (ii) the employee’s opportunity for profit or loss based on
managerial skill; (iii) the employee’s investment in equipment to complete the
task; (iv) the requisite level of skill; (v) the permanency of the working relationship; and (vi) whether the service rendered is an integral part of the employer’s
business model. Id.
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tort liability. 68 The Borello court ultimately held that supplemented
with the “remedial statutory purpose” and examined against the
common-law agency test, the functional nature of the relationship
between the farmer and the agricultural laborers were that of employer-employee.69
Interestingly enough, the Dynamex court noted that federal
courts have declined to apply the “remedial statutory purpose” analysis to federal statutes and have instead required adherence to the
traditional common law test absent a specific “statutory standard or
definition of employment.”70 The court nevertheless pointed to the
lack of interference by the California Legislature as approval of the
“remedial statutory purpose” principle—an approval that later manifested itself into AB 5.71
Although the Borello framework, which encompassed a “remedial statutory purpose” principle, may have seemed unfavorable to
Dynamex, the Martinez framework would likely have been a much
harsher obstacle for Dynamex to overcome. The Dynamex court addressed its decision, Martinez v. Combs, where it found a similar
wage order defined “employ” and “employer” broadly.72
The Martinez court examined a wage order from the Industrial
Welfare Commission, which described employers as “those entities
who ‘employ or suffer or permit’ persons to work for them.’” 73 The
“suffer or permit” standard was “derived from statutes regulating
and prohibiting child labor that were in use . . . in 1916.”74 The Martinez court explained that an entity that “knows that persons are
working in his or her business without having been formally hired,
or while being paid less than the minimum wage, clearly suffers or
permits that work by failing to prevent it.”75 Further, the wage order
defined “employer” to include a person or entity that “employs or
exercises control over the wages, hours, or working conditions of
68

Borello, 769 P.2d at 406.
See id. at 410.
70
Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 20.
71
See id. Accordingly, as this Note later discusses, AB 5 recognizes Borello
as the appropriate test for classification when the “ABC” test is not applicable or
where such occupations are expressly exempt from its reach. See infra Part II.A.2.
72
Id. at 20 (citing Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259 (Cal. 2010)).
73
Id. at 21 (quoting Martinez, 231 P.3d at 273).
74
Id. (citing Martinez, 231 P.3d at 273).
75
Id. at 23 (quoting Martinez, 231 P.3d at 281).
69
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any person.”76 Ultimately, the Martinez court found that “employ,”
under the wage order, had three alternative definitions: (1) to exercise control over the wages, hours or working conditions (per the
plain language of the wage order); (2) to “suffer or permit to work,”
as construed in its use in child labor laws; or (3) to “engage” in work
as understood in the common-law agency context.77
Dynamex claimed that strict application of Martinez’s “suffer or
permit” standard would practically render all workers directly hired
to provide services as employees because businesses can “always be
said to knowingly ‘suffer or permit’ such an individual to work for
the business.”78 Accordingly, Dynamex argued, Martinez was inadequate to distinguish employees from true independent contractors
such as plumbers.79
The Dynamex court agreed, and after noting how far-reaching
the “suffer or permit to work” standard would apply, the court tempered the standard by adopting the “ABC” test employed by other
jurisdictions.80 The court explained that the “suffer or permit to
work” standard imposed a rebuttable presumption of an employeremployee relationship unless the hiring party could establish the
worker as an independent contractor.81 In order to overcome this
presumption, the hiring party would have to establish each element
in the three-factor “ABC” test which consists of (A) establishing the
worker was free from the hiring party’s control, both by contract and
in fact; (B) establishing the worker performs work “outside the usual
course” of the hiring party’s business; and (C) establishing the
worker is independently engaged in the same type of work provided
to the hiring party.82
The Dynamex court then found that sufficient commonality of
interest existed for class certification under prongs B and C of the
“ABC” test.83 The court found that determining whether the certified
class of drivers performed a service outside the usual course of
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

Id. at 21 (quoting Martinez, 231 P.3d at 283).
Id. at 22–23 (quoting Martinez, 231 P.3d at 278).
Id. at 29.
Id. at 29–30.
See id. at 30, 34.
Id. at 34.
Id.
See id. at 41–42.
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Dynamex’s business was easily resolvable on a class basis.84 Because the “ABC” test requires a hiring party to establish each prong,
the court noted class certification was sufficient on prong B’s finding alone; however, the court also found sufficient commonality of
interest in whether the driver class independently engaged in the services provided to Dynamex as part of their own distinct business or
trade.85
1. DYNAMEX DISCUSSION
In reaching its conclusion of class certification, the Dynamex
court noted some particular facts that are useful in considering
whether the “ABC” test—and subsequently AB 5—should be applied to TNCs operating under the gig economy. The most significant fact, which the court addressed within the second paragraph of
the opinion, was that Dynamex’s procedure of classifying its drivers
as independent contractors rather than employees was a new business practice:86
Although in some circumstances classification as an
independent contractor may be advantageous to
workers as well as to businesses, the risk that workers who should be treated as employees may be improperly misclassified as independent contractors is
significant in light of the potentially substantial economic incentives that a business may have in mischaracterizing some workers as independent contractors . . . .In recent years, the relevant regulatory
agencies of both the federal and state governments
have declared that misclassification of workers as independent contractors rather than employees is a
very serious problem, depriving federal and state
governments of billions of dollars in tax revenue and
millions of workers of the labor law protections to
which they are entitled.87
84

Id.
Id. at 42.
86
See id. The court first mentions this fact two paragraphs after delineating
the persistent issue of worker misclassification. Id.
87
Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
85
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Indeed, the court made clear that economic incentive is what drove
Dynamex to undergo reclassification of its drivers as independent
contractors: “In 2004, Dynamex converted all of its drivers to independent contractors after management concluded such a conversion
would generate economic savings for the company.”88
Another distinguishing fact noted in the opinion was Dynamex’s
business model. The court characterized Dynamex as a
nationwide same-day courier and delivery service
that operates a number of business centers . . . offers
on-demand, same-day pickup and delivery services
to the public . . . and . . . has a number of large business customers—including Office Depot and Home
Depot—for whom it delivers purchased goods and
picks up returns on a regular basis.89
Because the drivers were an essential part of Dynamex’s delivery
service business model, the company had little room to argue the
drivers were independent contractors.
Dynamex’s relationship and obligatory procedures for its drivers
were also significant. Drivers that elected to be assigned as part of
the dedicated fleet were required to notify Dynamex on which days
they intended to work even though they could set their own schedules.90 Drivers that performed on-demand work were “required to
obtain a Nextel cellular telephone”—at no cost to Dynamex—to receive delivery orders.91 Drivers were liable for any loss incurred due
to failed timely deliveries, were expected to wear Dynamex shirts,
and were required to place Dynamex decals on their vehicles.92 Dynamex drivers were not prohibited from making deliveries for other
competitors but could not prioritize a competitor’s delivery over that
of Dynamex.93
In finding for the plaintiff’s class certification, the Dynamex
court resolved commonality in prongs B and C of the “ABC” test
because the plaintiff-drivers exclusively delivered for Dynamex and
88
89
90
91
92
93

Id. at 8.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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avoided the fact-intensive inquiry of the control element in prong
A.94
Even though there are several similarities between Dynamex and
Uber/Lyft, the rideshare corporations still maintain that under Dynamex and AB 5, their drivers are independent contractors.95 In contrast to the specific cost-savings justification employed by Dynamex, TNCs can argue that their businesses have been wholly dependent on an independent contractor model since inception.96 Further, TNCs continue to maintain that, first and foremost, they are
technology companies that simply match drivers to riders,97 unlike
Dynamex who contracted with other corporations to fulfill delivery
needs.98
Most significantly, however, is that the Dynamex court only
tempered the “suffer or permit” standard after accepting Dynamex’s
argument that strict application would render all workers employees.99 The adoption of the “ABC” test by the California Supreme
Court was essentially a response to the “pragmatic effect” that the
Martinez standard would have accomplished. Similarly, the “pragmatic effect” prism advocated in this Note would take into account
the foundational business model of TNCs (or the gig economy at
large) and its lasting effect. The Dynamex decision illustrates that
courts are willing to consider and alter legal standards based on the
“pragmatic effect” principle. This Note advocates courts should do
so when dealing with TNC driver classification as current law is inept to handle these gig economy issues. This Note will now turn to
the text of AB 5 to determine whether the California Legislature has
foreclosed these arguments and further discusses the basis for
Uber/Lyft’s independent contractor theory.

94

See id. at 41–42.
See Said, supra note 11.
96
See Uber Techs., Inc., supra note 1, at 28; Lyft, Inc., supra note 15, at 28.
97
See Janet Burns, Uber and Lyft Won’t Admit What They Are, FORBES (Mar.
20, 2019, 1:11 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/janetwburns/2019/03/20/uberand-lyft-dont-know-what-they-are-courts-have-some-ideas/#46d5900cc13f.
98
Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 8.
99
See id. at 30, 34.
95
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2. AB 5 DISCUSSION
The codification of Dynamex in AB 5 emphasizes the need to
properly classify employees in order to place payment obligations
on employers.100 These payment obligations include contributions
to unemployment insurance, disability insurance, workers’ compensation premiums, minimum wage requirements, paid sick and family leave, and payroll taxes.101 Further, AB 5 designates worker misclassification as a “significant factor in the erosion of the middle
class and the rise in income inequality.”102 AB 5 makes clear that
there is a presumption of an employer-employee relationship:
SEC. 2. Section 2750.3 is added to the Labor Code, to read:
2750.3. (a) (1) For purposes of the provisions of this
code and the Unemployment Insurance Code, and for
the wage orders of the Industrial Welfare Commission, a person providing labor or services for remuneration shall be considered an employee rather than
an independent contractor unless the hiring entity
demonstrates that all of the following conditions are
satisfied:
(A) The person is free from the control and direction of the hiring entity in connection with the
performance of the work, both under the contract
for the performance of the work and in fact.
(B) The person performs work that is outside the
usual course of the hiring entity’s business.
(C) The person is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or
business of the same nature as that involved in
the work performed.103

100

See generally Assemb. B. 5, 2019–20 Sess. § 1 (Cal. 2019). These employment obligations will be further discussed in Part III of this Note.
101
Id. § 1(b).
102
Id. § 1(c).
103
Id. § 2(a)(1) (emphasis added).
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Interestingly, notwithstanding the assertion that significant erosion of the middle class and the increase of income inequality is due
to employee misclassification, the majority of AB 5’s text is spent
outlining exceptions and fails to explicitly designate TNC drivers as
employees.104 AB 5 leaves a court with explicit discretion to not apply Dynamex’s “ABC” test if the court determines that the test is
inapplicable to a particular circumstance.105 Instead, the court is to
apply the common-law agency test articulated in the Borello decision.106 AB 5 then goes on to expressly exclude various occupations
from the “ABC” test and makes Borello the default agency test for
most applications.107
The enormous carve-out of exceptions raises significant questions that Uber and Lyft can exploit in their favor.108 First, is a court
to apply the “ABC” test in like circumstances to Dynamex, where
the court can determine the independent contractor classification
was adopted by the corporation as a means to circumvent obligatory
employer contributions, rather than a business model crafted on an
independent contractor model from inception? Second, is Dynamex’s appeal to “remedial statutory purpose” still as equally applicable due to AB 5’s language? Or, alternatively, have the explicit
exceptions swallowed “remedial statutory purpose” whole? Finally,
is legislative history enough to effectuate what the majority of those
in favor of employee-driver classification believe AB 5 to have accomplished?109
104
105
106

See generally id. § 2.
Id. §2(a)(3).
Id.; see supra note 67 (describing common-law agency test adopted in Bo-

rello).
107
Assemb. B. 5, 2019–20 Sess. § 2 (Cal. 2019). AB 5 expressly excludes the
following from the “ABC” test and makes Borello the default: physicians, surgeons, dentists, podiatrists, psychologist, veterinarians, lawyers, architects, engineers, private investigators, accountants, broker-dealers, investment advisers, direct salespersons, commercial fishermen, contracts for “professional services”
(including marketing, human resources, travel agents, graphic designers, fine artists, photographers, and photojournalists), repossession agencies, and the construction industry (subject to its own requirements/restrictions). Id. § 2(b)–(h).
108
See Said, supra note 11.
109
Although Proposition 22 cut short pending litigation over AB 5’s enforcement in California, in August 2020, a state judge held that Uber and Lyft had to
comply with AB 5. See Preetika Rana, Lyft, Uber Get More Time as They Fight
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For all of the media attention and public support garnered by AB
5, one would expect AB 5 to clearly designate Uber and Lyft drivers
as employees rather than independent contractors. Nevertheless, AB
5 provides courts ample room to make the “ABC” test inapplicable
in the rideshare-driver context. Courts could reasonably conclude
that Dynamex and AB 5 are applicable to only those situations where
it seems the corporation is trying to circumvent state benefit payments. This is exactly the atmosphere Dynamex was decided on. As
was discussed above, the Dynamex court made explicit mention of
Dynamex’s relabeling of its drivers as independent contractors for
the express purpose of saving cost to the company.110
This, however, is not the case for Uber and Lyft. Both ridesharing companies were founded on the idea that such a business venture
would operate under an independent contractor theory and have
warned potential investors of the consequences of such designation
in their prospectuses.111 Uber warned investors that an employee
designation would “require [Uber] to fundamentally change [its]
business model, and consequently have an adverse effect on [its]
business and financial condition.”112 This disclosure was made after
Uber identified several adverse rulings in the United Kingdom,
France, and the United States, more specifically, the Dynamex decision.113
Lyft similarly warned investors by stating:
[A]ny legal proceeding that classifies a driver on a
ridesharing platform as an employee may require us
to significantly alter our existing business model and
operations and impact our ability to add qualified
drivers to our platform and grow our business, which
California Order, THE WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2020, 6:59 PM) [hereinafter Rana,
Lyft, Uber Get More Time], https://www.wsj.com/articles/lyft-to-suspend-service-in-california-11597942614?st=ja1iz41e4f7gxkr&reflink=article_email_share. Subsequently, both Uber and Lyft warned that they would be
limiting or discontinuing operations in California, which prompted an emergency
stay by a state appeals court. Id.
110
See Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 8 (Cal.
2018).
111
See Uber Techs., Inc., supra note 1, at 28; Lyft, Inc., supra note 15, at 28.
112
Uber Techs., Inc., supra note 1, at 28.
113
See id.
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could have an adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations.114
Uber and Lyft are not postured in the same position as Dynamex
because of the independent contractor model of TNCs from inception.115 Thus, a court can likely maneuver around the “ABC” test, if
so inclined. Additionally, it is important to consider Dynamex’s application of “remedial statutory purpose” as it applies to social benefits and the contrary language of AB 5. As previously discussed,
the “remedial statutory purpose” construction enabled courts to read
in an expansionist view of employee protections under the workers’
compensation law at issue in Borello and in the wage statute at issue
in Dynamex.116 A court, however, will have to do some work in establishing that AB 5’s purpose is to guarantee employee benefits to
rideshare drivers amongst the backdrop of AB 5’s language.
First, if the purpose of AB 5 is to curb the misuse of employee
misclassification,117 why would the bill include such a large swath
of exceptions that reach major industries operating in just this manner? This question would likely have a court consider the factors at
play in Dynamex that lead the court to adopt the presumptive employee classification and “ABC” test. The most significant factor for
the applicability of the “ABC” test would be the highly suspicious
motive of switching to an independent contractor status for the purposes of cost-savings by circumventing employee benefits.118
If the forces at play which rallied breath into AB 5 were, in fact,
those of TNC driver concerns, why would the California legislature
write AB 5 in such a manner that leaves wide uncertainty as to the
TNC driver status? A much simpler solution would be to designate
the TNC driver relationship as one clearly statutorily defined as
114

Lyft, Inc., supra note 15, at 29.
See Frazer, supra note 3.
116
See supra Part II.A.
117
Additionally, some courts have given little weight to purposivist arguments
on the grounds that determining statutory purpose is a futile task given the inherent give-and-take process of legislation. See, e.g., Van Hollen, Jr. v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 811 F.3d 486, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“Statutes are hardly, if ever, singular in purpose. Rather, most laws seek to achieve a variety of ends in a way that
reflects the give-and-take of the legislative process.”).
118
See Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 5 (Cal.
2018).
115
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employer-employee instead of largely describing what AB 5 does
not pertain to and relying on a statutory presumption. AB 5’s silence
on the TNC driver relationship is yet another factor leaning in Uber
and Lyft’s favor when arguing around the applicability of AB 5.
Given the AB 5’s legislative history and advocacy from TNC drivers in support,119 however, a court could also reconcile these tensions in favor of TNC drivers when faced with the argument that the
“ABC” test is inapplicable to Uber and Lyft.
In summary, a court against the application of the “ABC” test,
as articulated in Dynamex, can just as equally decline application of
the test as a court inclined to apply it. Instead of giving TNC drivers
and corporations a clear indication of where they stand on the relationship scale, AB 5 created another layer of uncertainty until Proposition 22 settled the matter in California.120 Other jurisdictions,
however, could attempt to adopt the “ABC” test. Unlike the “ABC”
test, Borello does not begin with a presumption of employee designation, which TNCs will want to take advantage of, despite the “remedial statutory purpose” principle that Borello does apply.121 Borello further relies on several factors of the common-law agency test
that TNCs have been successful in the past.122 AB 5 applies the tempered Martinez standard through the narrow “ABC” test with the
goal of finding an employee designation.123 The “ABC” test takes
little account of the financial impact an employer-employee designation would have and even less thought on how such an impact
would incentivize TNCs to invest and develop autonomous driving
capability.124 Without the backdrop of the “pragmatic effect,” the
“ABC” test would injure state revenue and workers as the gig economy could significantly shrink.125
Many critics may characterize the “pragmatic effect” advocated
for in this Note as nothing more than mere judicial activism. This
Note, however, recognizes that the debate is long past judicial
119

See della Cava, supra note 14.
See Rana, Reclassifying Drivers, supra note 13.
121
See Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 17 (citing S.G. Borello & Sons v. Dep’t of Indus.
Rel, 769 P.2d 399, 406–07 (Cal. 1989)).
122
See id. at 18 n.12; Borello, 769 P.2d at 406–07.
123
See Assemb. B. 5, 2019–20 Sess. § 1 (Cal. 2019); Dynamex, 416 P.3d at
35; see also Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259, 279 (Cal. 2010).
124
See generally Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 35.
125
See infra Part III.
120
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activism. The Dynamex decision is just one example of judicial activism in American jurisprudence. When courts craft new legal
standards based on societal implications—altering legal standards
already in place—that later manifest in statutory adoption by the
legislature, judicial activism is arguably at its peak. It may very well
be that codification signals courts were right to consider societal implications and as such, the criticism that the “pragmatic effect”
prism advocated here is nothing but judicial activism, is unavailing.
This Note will next discuss Florida’s approach to employment classification and how it differs from California.
B.

The Florida Approach and Recognized Public Policy
Model
At the time of this writing, Florida has not adopted the “ABC”
test articulated in Dynamex, but there are many points of agreement
between California’s treatment of the employee classification test in
Borello and that of Florida’s in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Kendall and its progeny.126 Borello and Kendall both pointed to the
factors stated in the Restatement §220,127 and both found the issue
of “control” significant.128 Even though Kendall was a negligence
action, it set the stage for litigation over employee classification in
126

Mia. Herald Pub. Co. v. Kendall, 88 So. 2d 276, 276 (Fla. 1956). Kendall
involved a negligence claim against the Miami Herald when a newspaper delivery
person struck the appellee with a motorcycle while delivering newspapers. Id. The
Court first looked to the contract provision between the newspaper delivery person and the Miami Herald. Id. at 277. The Court determined the contract established an independent contractor relationship and, though not dispositive, would
require a showing otherwise to overcome the agreed upon relationship. Id. at 279.
The Court further examined the practical nature of control on the delivery person
by the Miami Herald and determined that—under the first Restatement §220 factors—the delivery person was an independent contractor. Id. at 279 (citing
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. L. INST. 1933)).
127
Compare Kendall, 88 So. 2d at 279 with Borello, 769 P.2d at 404. Kendall
cited the first Restatement of Agency Law § 220, while Borello cited the Restatement §220. See Kendall, 88 So. 2d at 279; Borello, 769 P.2d at 404. Restatement
§220, however, remained materially similar between the two versions, except for
the addition of a factor in the second Restatement of Agency Law. See
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. L. INST. 1933); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. L. INST. 1958).
128
Compare Kendall, 88 So. 2d at 277–79 with Borello, 769 P.2d at 400–01,
403–404 (both providing detailed analysis of the control exerted by the principle
over the servant).
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the context of social benefits. In Keith v. News & Sun Sentinel Co.,
the Florida Supreme Court held that “the Kendall analysis of status
applies regardless of whether the issue arises in the context of a tort
claim or a workers’ compensation claim.”129 Keith involved a workers’ compensation claim against the Sun Sentinel from one of its
newspaper street vendors.130 The Sun Sentinel contracted with a delivery agent who in turn hired the street vendors.131
Like the Borello court, Keith recognized the “remedial statutory
purpose” of Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Act but fell short of
the talismanic effect Borello impugned: “Although we do not find
that this policy factor controls the outcome of this case, we agree it
is a proper matter to consider, and may be potentially helpful in the
resolution of a case otherwise too close to call.”132
In applying the Kendall framework, the Keith Court affirmed the
compensation judge’s analysis, which first looked to the agreement
between the parties and determined the parties intended an independent contractor relationship.133 The compensation judge then determined whether the agreement itself or the actual practice of the
parties mitigated the independent contractor status and functionally
created sufficient control over one party, rendering them an employee.134 The Court found little factual evidence that the Sun Sentinel controlled the means by which the newspaper street vendor was
to conduct business and found no evidence of a direct relationship
between the Sun Sentinel and Keith.135 On these facts, the Florida
Supreme Court affirmed the compensation judge’s findings below
that Keith was an independent contractor and ineligible for workers’
compensation benefits.136
129

Keith v. News & Sun Sentinel Co., 667 So. 2d 167, 171 (Fla. 1995).
Id. at 168.
131
Id. The contract between the Sun Sentinel and the delivery agent declared
an independent contractor relationship. Id. The delivery agent was responsible for
its own tax liability and contributions. Id. The delivery agent also provided its
street vendors with the option of accident insurance, which the delivery agent paid
premiums for through the Sun Sentinel, which would, in turn, pay the insurance
carrier. Id.
132
Id. at 171.
133
Id. at 171–72.
134
See id. at 172–73.
135
See id.
136
Id. at 173–74.
130
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In fleshing out Florida’s approach to employee classification,
the Eleventh Circuit discussed Kendall and Keith in a dispute arising
between FedEx and its drivers over business expense reimbursement
and overtime pay.137 The Eleventh Circuit looked at the agreement
between FedEx and the drivers, which provided that the drivers were
independent contractors and that the means by which the delivery
tasks were completed were “within the discretion of the drivers.”138
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit examined other provisions of the
agreement and the practical control that FedEx exercised over the
drivers.139 Most significantly, the court recognized that the robust
contract provisions, despite their characterization of the relationship, evidenced considerable control over the drivers on behalf of
FedEx.140 The agreement reserved to FedEx “control over the type,
configuration, and appearance of the driver’s truck and the tools and
instrumentalities used for package delivery, such as the FedEx scanner and recordkeeping methods.”141
The Court then analogized the issue before it to Del Pilar v. DHL
Global Customer Solutions, Inc., which contained similar facts and
in which it found that summary judgment was inappropriate due to
the contractual provisions evincing control despite an independent
contractor designation.142 Based on the highly fact-intensive nature
of employee classification, the Eleventh Circuit found that sufficient
facts existed supporting each party’s arguments and reversed the
district court’s summary judgment in favor of FedEx on the independent contractor designation.143
C.
The Florida and California Discussion
As these cases make clear, Florida primarily turns to an examination of the relationship as intended by written contract (“party-

137

See Carlson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 787 F.3d 1313, 1316,
1320–22 (11th Cir. 2015).
138
Id. at 1319 (quoting In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 734 F. Supp.
2d 557 (N.D. Ind. 2010)).
139
See id. at 1325–26.
140
See id.
141
Id. at 1321.
142
See id. at 1323–24 (discussing Del Pilar v. DHL Glob. Customer Sols.,
Inc., 993 So. 2d 142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)).
143
See id. at 1326–28.
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intent”) and then looks to any indicia of a contrary status.144 As in
Carlson, the robust contract provisions that nevertheless characterized the driver relationship as that of an independent contractor established genuine issues as to whether FedEx exercised significant
control over the drivers.145 Even though Keith recognized the public
policy aspect of Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Act,146 the subsequent case law demonstrates that Florida spends little time on such
concerns and primarily relies on a “control” analysis and the factors
outlined in the Restatement §220.147
That said, this is in opposition to California’s Borello framework
that seems to engage in “remedial statutory purpose” as a means to
expand employee classification in social benefit instances.148 Further, Dynamex and AB 5 are completely inconsistent with Florida’s
Keith framework, as the former establishes a presumption of employee designation,149 while Keith first turns to the intended relationship of the parties, as evinced through their contract, and then
examines the pragmatic relationship.150
As discussed in Part II.A.2., Dynamex and AB 5 leave plenty of
questions unanswered for both parties. If anything, Dynamex and
AB 5 incentivize TNCs to automate away the substantial California
workforce under their respective umbrellas. Under Keith, at the very
least, a party can expect a court to begin with an examination of the
written contract to determine relationship intent while still being
cognizant that the actual relationship conditions will also be scrutinized.151 By its language, AB 5 presumes an employee relationship
but, nevertheless, grants plenty of discretion to a reviewing court to
make the “ABC” test inapplicable, a position Uber maintains.152 If
certainty and proper employee classification for TNCs drivers was
an aim of AB 5, it falls short on this front. This Note will next discuss the analysis employed by a federal agency, the NLRB, in reaching employment classification decisions.
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152

Keith v. News & Sun Sentinel Co., 667 So. 2d 167, 171 (Fla. 1995).
See Carlson, 787 F.3d at 1328–29.
Id. at 171.
See supra note 52.
See supra Part II.A.2.
See id.
Keith v. News & Sun Sentinel Co., 667 So. 2d 167, 171 (Fla. 1995).
See id.
See Said, supra note 11.
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D.
The Federal Approach
For purposes of examining the classification approach adopted
by federal agencies in the context of employee rights and benefits,
this Note takes a look at the approach adopted by the NLRB. The
NLRB is charged with the administration of the National Labor Relations Act (the “NLRA”).153 The NLRA enables employees, with
or without a union, to take steps in improving their working conditions, wages, and benefits with at least some protection against managerial retaliation for such efforts.154 Of particular importance to this
Note is the fact that the NLRA explicitly exempts workers that are
deemed to be independent contractors from the NLRA’s protection.155 Accordingly, a threshold requirement for NLRA protection
is a determination that the worker is an employee for purposes of the
Act.
The NLRB’s guidance on this vital threshold issue is illustrative
of the distinct approach between federal and state governments. Of
primary interest is NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel (the
“OGC”) Advice Memorandum to Region 20 on the issue of whether
TNC drivers are employees or independent contractors.156 The advice memorandum was written in response to two charges of unlawful termination and one charge of unlawful domination of a labor
organization against Uber.157 Accordingly, whether these drivers
were entitled to protection from the alleged conduct of Uber hinged
on their status as either employees or independent contractors.158
The OGC ultimately concluded that these drivers159 were
153

See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169.
Employee Rights, NAT’L LAB. RELS. BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-weprotect/rights/employee-rights (last visited May 15, 2021).
155
29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
156
See NLRB Advice Memorandum, supra note 9, at 1. Region 20 of the
NLRB services parts of California and the state of Hawaii. Region 20 - San Francisco, NAT’L LAB. RELS. BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/who-we-are/regional-offices/region-20-san-francisco (last visited May 15, 2021).
157
See NLRB Advice Memorandum, supra note 9, at 1–2.
158
See id. at 3.
159
The drivers were UberX and UberBLACK drivers. Id. at 14. The only significant differences between the two types of drivers are that UberBLACK drivers
invest more capital because they must provide higher-end vehicles, can contract
with Uber as distinct business entities, and can hire others to drive their vehicles.
Id. at 14–15.
154
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independent contractors by similarly applying the Restatement §220
factors160 previously discussed. Unlike Borello and Kendall, however, the OGC did not turn to “remedial statutory purpose” like California, nor did it begin its analysis on the intended relationship of
the parties like Florida. Instead, the OGC applied the common law
test “through ‘the prism of entrepreneurial opportunity’ set forth in
SuperShuttle.”161 The entrepreneurial opportunity principle, as articulated by the D.C. Circuit, is “an important animating principle by
which to evaluate [common law] factors in cases where some factors
cut one way and some the other [and looks to] whether the position
presents the opportunities and risks inherent in entrepreneurialism.”162
SuperShuttle involved a dispute between SuperShuttle DallasFort Worth (“SuperShuttle”) and its drivers under the NLRA.163
Prior to 2005, these drivers were designated as employees by SuperShuttle.164 In 2005, SuperShuttle DFW converted to a franchise
business model and required the drivers to sign agreements recharacterizing their relationship as independent contractors.165
On its way to affirming the Regional Director’s finding that
these franchise drivers were independent contractors, the SuperShuttle Board took an interesting detour discussing the inapplicability of
the “economic dependency” test implicitly disapproved by Congress.166 The economic dependency test examined whether the putative independent contractor was dependent on the employer for its
livelihood, favoring an employee relationship.167 The NLRB discussed how the Supreme Court of the United States, similar to California in Borello, adopted a public policy reasoning for adopting a
160

Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 14 (quoting SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 9 (Jan.
25, 2019)).
162
FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
163
See SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 75, at 1.
164
Id. at 3.
165
Id. The relationship also provided the drivers with the ability to hire their
own relief drivers but the “franchisee” drivers were required to supply their own
shuttles and pay franchise fees and flat weekly fees for the right to use the SuperShuttle brand and dispatch services. Id. Additionally, the drivers were free to
work as much as they wanted and were entitled to keep the money earned for
assignments they accepted. Id.
166
Id. at 9 (citing NLRB v. United Insurance Co., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968)).
167
See id. at 9 n.15.
161
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broad definition of the word “employee” under the NLRA in United
States v. Silk.168 The Silk Court recognized that in light of the purpose of the NLRA, the primary consideration was not the control
factor heavily relied upon in the common law test but rather whether
reading in the putative employee under the NLRA would effectuate
the purposes of that act.169 Even though at the time, the NLRB was
in favor of the expansive reading of the term “employee” by the Silk
Court, the SuperShuttle Board discussed Congress’ subsequent implicit rejection of such a reading:
In the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947, Congress
reacted to this expansive alternative to the commonlaw test by specifically excluding independent contractors from coverage under the Act. In subsequent
cases, the Supreme Court recognized that Congress
had effectively abrogated the holdings of Hearst and
Silk to the extent they authorized policy-based alternatives to the common-law agency test of employee
and independent-contractor status in the absence of
express statutory language.170
After dispensing with the “economic dependency” test, the SuperShuttle Board then applied the common-law factors to SuperShuttle drivers and specifically noted that in taxi-like disputes,
the most significant factors against the backdrop of entrepreneurial
opportunity are: (1) the extent of control by the employer and; (2)
the payment scheme.171
SuperShuttle exhibited little control over its franchisee drivers
because the drivers had near autonomy as to their day-to-day schedule and performance since they could decide whether or not to accept trips, when to work, and what routes to take within their designated areas.172 The SuperShuttle Board also noted that the franchisee
drivers were subject to various regulations by the Dallas Fort Worth
168

Id. at 9 (citing United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713 (1947)).
See Silk, 331 U.S. at 713 (citing NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111,
131–32 (1943)) (recognizing the purpose of the NLRA was to eliminate labor
disputes and even the playing field in context of bargaining power).
170
SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 75, at 9.
171
See id. at 12–13.
172
See id. at 12.
169
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Airport, but this was not indicative of SuperShuttle’s control over
the drivers.173 The requirements set on the drivers by SuperShuttle
consisted of frequent vehicle inspections, set fares, and some minimal training which the SuperShuttle Board found were “vastly outweighed by the general control that franchisees have over their
working conditions.”174
On SuperShuttle’s payment scheme to its drivers, the SuperShuttle Board discussed the inferential differences between a flat fee and
commission-based fee: “When an employer does not share in a
driver’s profits from fares, the employer lacks motivation to control
or direct the manner and means of the driver’s work.”175 Because
the franchisee drivers were only required to pay a flat fee, the SuperShuttle payment structure leaned towards an independent contractor status.176
The SuperShuttle Board went on to discuss the fact that the drivers supplied their own vehicles, that SuperShuttle did not supervise
the method in which the drivers performed their tasks, and finally,
that the written contract made clear that the franchisee drivers were
independent contractors.177 The Board concluded that the extent of
control, the payment scheme, and the investment risk in self-supplied vehicles by the drivers provided the “franchisees with significant entrepreneurial opportunity and control over how much money
they make each month.”178
Applying the SuperShuttle analysis to the challenges launched
against Uber by its drivers, the OGC placed significant weight on
the extent of control over the drivers by Uber and Uber’s payment
structure.179 The OGC found that Uber drivers had significant entrepreneurial opportunity and were thus independent contractors because they could determine what rides to accept, could work for a
competitor service, and were not bound to drive at all.180 The OGC
further reasoned that Uber drivers actually had more control over
their earning potential than the franchisee drivers in SuperShuttle
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180

Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 13–14.
Id. at 14.
See NLRB Advice Memorandum, supra note 9, at 4–5.
Id. at 5.
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since those drivers could not negotiate the standard fees set by SuperShuttle, while Uber drivers could log in or out of the platform
when “surge” fares were active.181
In contrast to the SuperShuttle franchisee drivers, however, Uber
operates on a commission-based system which supports an employee inference because Uber would have a motivating factor to
control the driver’s means and manner, decreasing entrepreneurial
opportunity.182 The OGC noted that the payment structure was not
dispositive but only indicative of the amount of control an employer
might actually possess, and accordingly looked to the amount of
control Uber exhibited based on this fee structure.183 The OGC
noted that Uber did not exert control over the driver’s means itself
but instead relied on customer feedback.184 It further reasoned that
in all reality, the Uber fee structure actually increased entrepreneurial opportunity because “this made it easier to take advantage of the
unlimited freedom they had to work for competitors or pursue other
ventures and drive for Uber only when it suited them.”185
The OGC, like the SuperShuttle Board, summarily looked at the
fact that drivers had to supply their own vehicles, were not supervised by Uber while they performed their tasks, and intended the
relationship to be that of an independent contractor as evidenced by
the written contract.186 These facts all supported independent contractor status even though the OGC acknowledged that no special
skill was necessary on behalf of the drivers and that the drivers were
in fact an integral part of Uber’s regular business.187 Accordingly,
the OGC concluded that UberX drivers were independent contractors under the NLRA and that UberBLACK drivers were not substantially distinct to be treated any differently.188
181

Id. at 9. “Surge” fares refers to increased fares for certain locations during
high-demand times which drivers could take advantage of for additional profitability. Id. at 7.
182
Id. at 10.
183
Id. at 11.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
See id. at 11–12.
187
Id. at 13.
188
Id. at 14–15. In fact, UberBLACK drivers were clearly independent contractors, inter alia, since they could hire other drivers and contracted with Uber
as distinct business entities. Id. at 15.
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1. NLRB DISCUSSION
The NLRB’s approach to the employment classification issue
makes clear that the “remedial statutory purpose” engagement seen
in California’s Borello, and subsequently the Dynamex precedent,
has been rejected by Congress and the Supreme Court under the
NLRA.189 Even though the NLRB’s approach is much closer to that
of Florida as seen in Keith, at least in the emphasis placed on the
common law factors in the Restatement §220,190 the NLRB applies
these factors through a different lens. While Florida applies the common law factors as against the backdrop of party intent,191 the NLRB
seems to place party intent low on the totem pole and keeps entrepreneurial opportunity at the forethought of its analysis.192
In reviewing the approaches taken by California, Florida, and
NLRB at the federal level, one thing is clear: A multitude of jurisdictions have essentially applied the same factors but have come to
different conclusions. They have done so not solely based on the
characterization of the facts involved, but also on the guiding principles the particular jurisdiction applied against these common law
factors. Accordingly, a party seeking to determine its relationship
status would avail itself of more certainty by ascertaining the jurisdictional guiding principles it finds itself up against rather than the
factors articulated in the Restatement §220.193
In fact, it is arguably this very jurisdictional guiding principle
that has manifested itself into California’s AB 5. The “remedial statutory purpose” principle discussed in Borello, Martinez, and Dynamex suggests as much. Based on this principle, employers are now
faced with a presumption of employer-employee, with the burden of
proving otherwise through the “ABC” test—yet another narrow variation of the common law factors.194 As such, this Note has identified the “remedial statutory purpose” principle, the “party-intent”
principle, and now the “entrepreneurial opportunity” principle as
189
The “statutory purpose” principle and the expansive read of the definition
of “employee” is still alive and well in other federal social benefit frameworks.
See infra Part IV.
190
See supra note 52.
191
See supra Part II.C.
192
See FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
193
See supra note 52.
194
See id.
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starting points for societal benefit employment classification. The
“pragmatic effect” principle would be especially applicable to gig
economy issues, which places at the forefront of the analysis the
necessary independent contractor designation giving rise to the gig
economy and the deleterious effect that an employee classification
would have.
2. LIABILITY TREATMENT OF TNC DRIVERS AND ITS IMPACT
ON SOCIAL BENEFITS
Even though this Note is primarily focused on the social benefit
aspect of employee classification, this is an appropriate time to raise
the issue in the context of liability. Just like the SuperShuttle Board
discussed congressional intent of the NLRA through subsequent legislation,195 a reviewing court in the context of social benefit classification could look in the same direction for guidance. As of the time
of this writing, every state, with the exception of Oregon, has some
form of insurance legislation pertaining to TNCs and their drivers.196
For practical purposes, this Note has classified these statutes into
four distinct groups by their relative treatment of the TNC driver
relationship. These four groups consist of: (1) explicit independent
contractor designation, (2) implicit independent contractor designation, (3) implicit independent contractor designation unless contracted otherwise, and (4) undefined relationship statutes.
The first group consists of those states that have explicitly defined the TNC driver relationship as that of an independent contractor. Although though there are some variations as to each state’s legislative language, states that follow this approach explicitly designate drivers as independent contractors so long as the TNCs meet
particular conditions.197 Some states explicitly designate the drivers
195

See Super SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 9 (Jan. 25, 2019).
See Transportation Network Company, PROP. CAS. INSURERS ASSOC.,
http://viewer.zmags.com/publication/60841263#/60841263/1 (last updated June
21, 2018).
197
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 627.748 (9) (2020) (“A TNC driver is an independent contractor and not an employee of the TNC if all of the following conditions
are met: (a) The TNC does not unilaterally prescribe specific hours during which
the TNC driver must be logged on to the TNC’s digital network. (b) The TNC
does not prohibit the TNC driver from using digital networks from other TNCs.
(c) The TNC does not restrict the TNC driver from engaging in any other
196
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as presumptively independent contractors, which can be rebutted
based on the common-law agency test.198
The second group consists of states that implicitly provide that
TNC drivers are independent contractors or alternatively are not employees. For example, Arizona maintains that TNCs “may but [are]
not deemed to own, operate or control a personal motor vehicle of a
transportation network company driver.”199 Connecticut defines
“driver” as “an individual who is not an employee of a transportation
network company but who uses a transportation network company
vehicle to provide prearranged rides.”200
The third group consists of states that essentially condition the
relationship on the terms of the written contract. States that follow
this approach use language similar to Rhode Island: “A transportation network company shall not be deemed to control, direct, or
manage the personal vehicles or transportation network company
drivers that connect to its digital network, except where agreed to by
written contract.”201
The fourth and final group are those states that are silent on the
relationship.202 This group consists of states that either define a
“driver” simply to be “a driver certified by a transportation network
company”203 or an individual who uses their own personal vehicle
and the TNC digital platform to perform prearranged ridges.204
As pointed out above, several states, either expressly or implicitly, maintain that drivers are independent contractors or at least not
employees. A reviewing state court could look to these statutes as
evidence of legislative intent when dealing with its own social benefit statute, but its weight will likewise ultimately depend on the
occupation or business. (d) The TNC and TNC driver agree in writing that the
TNC driver is an independent contractor with respect to the TNC.”).
198
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-280.8 (2019).
199
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-9551(3) (2020).
200
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 13b-116(2) (2019).
201
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-14.2-1(8) (West 2021).
202
The outliers include Virginia and California. Virginia simply refers to TNC
drivers as “partners.” See VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-2099.48 (2020). California, as
discussed above, will attempt to presumptively treat TNC drivers as employees
under AB 5 starting January 1, 2020. See CAL. LABOR CODE § 2750.3(a)(1) (West
2020).
203
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 159A1/2, § 1 (West 2020).
204
See MINN. STAT. § 65B.472(1)(f) (2020).
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guiding principle at play. The discussion above on agency jurisprudence on the state and federal level establishes that there are various
guiding principles in existence. This Note continues to argue that
one of these guiding principles should consider the “pragmatic effect” on the gig industry. With this in mind, this Note now turns to
the consequences TNCs face if confronted with an employee classification for its drivers.
III.
CONSEQUENCES OF EMPLOYEE DESIGNATION
Thus far, this Note has examined some of the tensions at play
within the legal debate over employee classification. What brings
this debate into perspective, however, is the financial impact an employer faces when an employment relationship is established.
Among other costs, employers are faced with statutory obligations
based on an employer-employee relationship. Some of these statutorily imposed costs consist of obligations under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act,205 the Federal Insurance Contributions Act,206 the Fair Labor Standards Act,207 the Family and Medical Leave Act,208 and other state-level obligations like workers’
compensation209 or unemployment benefits.210
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) was
enacted by Congress with the goal of financially securing employee
benefit plans and preventing retirees from losing such anticipated
benefits.211 ERISA applies to any employee benefit plan established
or maintained “by any employer engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce.”212 ERISA defines

205

29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461.
26 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3128.
207
29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219.
208
Id. §§ 2601–2619.
209
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 440 (2020).
210
See Sonja Sharp, Uber Drivers Secure Unemployment Benefits, WALL ST.
J. (Oct. 14, 2016, 9:27 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-drivers-secureunemployment-benefits-1476405341.
211
See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
212
Id. § 1003(a)(1).
206
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“employee” as “any individual employed by the employer.”213 Even
though ERISA is a complex statutory scheme, it provides some
noteworthy employee protections. First, it sets out that an employee
has a nonforfeitable right to their retirement benefit at retirement age
or vests a nonforfeitable percentage of the retirement benefit which
increases with years of service.214 ERISA does not seek to establish
a uniform pension plan for employees, rather it seeks to ensure that
whatever retirement plan is offered by the employer, the employee
will have access to its benefit upon retirement.215 The way ERISA
meets this end is by requiring employers to pay into a fund administered by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.216 The minimum payment amount is dependent on the particular plan established by the employer and its funding requirement.217 Even though
ERISA does not mandate a retirement plan, gaining employee classification would enable drivers to unionize under the NLRA and
condition negotiations on such benefits.218
The Federal Insurance Contributions Act (“FICA”)219 established a tax scheme that funds the Social Security Act (“SSA”).220
Employees are obligated to pay a 6.2% tax on earned wages which
funds the SSA and an additional 1.45% tax on earned wages, which
funds Medicare under the SSA.221 Under FICA, employers are obligated to match the employee’s contribution.222 FICA, in part, defines an “employee” as “any individual who, under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee
213
Id. § 1002(2)(B)(6); see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S.
318, 323 (1992) (holding that determination of “employee” under ERISA is analyzed under the common-law agency test).
214
See 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a).
215
See U.S. DEPT. OF LAB., FACT SHEET: WHAT IS ERISA,
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/fact-sheets/what-is-erisa (last visited May 15, 2021).
216
See 29 U.S.C. § 1302.
217
Id. § 1082(a)(1).
218
See generally id. §§ 151–169 (establishing rights of employees under the
NLRA).
219
26 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3128.
220
See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., NO. 05-10297, WHAT IS FICA? (2017),
https://www.ssa.gov/thirdparty/materials/pdfs/educators/What-is-FICAInfographic-EN-05-10297.pdf.
221
See 26 U.S.C. § 3101(a)–(b).
222
See id. § 3111(a)–(b).
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relationship, has the status of an employee.”223 Further, the Social
Security Administration has promulgated rules that declare the common law rules “the basic test” for determining employment classification.224
The Fair Labor Standards Act (the “FLSA”) was enacted by
Congress to establish a minimum standard of “living necessary for
health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers.”225 The FLSA
includes minimum hourly wage requirements226 and sets a maximum workweek of forty hours per week unless the employee is paid
at a rate of one and one-half times the regular rate at which employed.227 Currently, the FLSA minimum wage requirement is $7.25
per hour.228 The FLSA defines an “employee” as “any individual
employed by an employer,” and does not distinguish between fulltime or part-time employment.229 Interestingly enough, the determination of employee or independent contractor under the FLSA has
kept in tune with the same line of reasoning as Silk, discussed in Part
II.D. of this Note.230 The Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division—charged with administrating the FLSA—has continued to
maintain that “[t]he employer-employee relationship under the
FLSA is tested by ‘economic reality’ rather than ‘technical

223

Id. § 3121(d)(2).
20 C.F.R. § 404.1007(a) (2019). The Social Security Administration considers the following factors when determining employee status: (1) whether the
person you work for can fire you; (2) whether that person provides tools or equipment and a place to work; (3) whether you receive training or instructions from
the person you work for; (4) whether you are required to do the work yourself; (5)
whether you can hire, supervise, or pay assistants; (6) whether person you work
for sets your hours of work; (7) whether person you work for pays any of your
expenses; and (8) how often you are paid. Id.
225
29 U.S.C. § 202(a).
226
Id. § 206.
227
Id. § 207(a)(1).
228
Id. § 206(a)(1)(C).
229
Id. § 203(e)(1).
230
See United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713 (1947); see also Walling v.
Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150–51 (1947) (holding that the FLSA contained its own definition of “employee” which encompassed a large swath of employment otherwise contemplated as independent contractor work).
224
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concepts.’ It is not determined by the common law standards relating to master and servant.”231
The Family and Medical Leave Act (the “FMLA”)232 provides
employees with the ability to take unpaid leaves of absences for certain periods of time with continued employee benefits.233 Under the
FMLA, an employee who takes an absence protected under the statute does not lose any accrued employment benefits and is entitled to
the same or equivalent position held upon return.234 Additionally,
the employer must maintain the employee’s medical coverage under
any “group health plan” while the employee is on protected leave
under the FMLA.235 The FMLA, however, only applies if the employer employs fifty or more employees at a particular worksite.236
The FMLA defines “employee” as “an employee who has been employed . . . for at least 12 months . . . and for at least 1,250 hours of
service during the previous 12-month period.”237 Further, the FMLA
states that “employee” has the same meaning as “employee” under
the FLSA.238 Accordingly, courts apply the “economic realities” test
in determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists
for FMLA purposes.239
On the state level, TNCs can also be subjected to additional obligations, like workers’ compensation. Workers’ compensation provides employees with the ability to recover expenses incurred due
to workplace injuries.240 In return, the employer is insulated from

231

U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. FACT SHEET, supra note 48; see also U.S. DEP’T OF
LAB., WAGE & HOUR DIV., FINAL RULE: INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR STATUS
UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (2021), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/flsa/2021-independent-contractor (reaffirming the “economic reality”
test under the FLSA and emphasizing the factors of control and profit/loss opportunity as the “most probative.”).
232
29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2619.
233
Id. § 2614(a)(1).
234
Id. § 2614(a)(2).
235
Id. § 2614(c)(1).
236
See id. § 2611(2)(B)(ii).
237
Id. § 2611(2)(A)(i)–(ii).
238
Id. § 2611(3).
239
See Coulibaly v. Tillerson, 273 F. Supp. 3d 16, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
240
See FLA. STAT. § 440.015 (2020).
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tort claims by the employee due to the cause of injury.241 In Florida,
the Workers’ Compensation Law applies to employers that employ
four or more employees.242 Independent contractors who are not in
the construction industry are not covered, and the statute sets out
classification factors.243 The statute enables the employee to continue to receive their average weekly pay, subject to various factors.244 Additionally, the employer is required to pay the employee
a percentage of their weekly wage based on the degree of disability
sustained.245 In 2015, workers’ compensation was estimated to cost
employers $1.32 per $100 of earned wages.246
Another state obligation can be in the form of unemployment
benefits. In fact, Uber has already been found liable for unemployment benefits in New York in some cases.247 In 2015, the New York
State Department of Labor determined that an Uber driver was an
employee for purposes of unemployment insurance, while finding
other drivers were independent contractors during the same time
frame.248 With these obligations in mind, this Note takes a glance at
the Ford Motor Company, which is illustrative of the potential costs
some of these requirements place on employers.
A.

The Ford Motor Company and Statutory Obligation
Discussion
At the extreme end of the spectrum, the Ford Motor Company
provides a glimpse of the costs of employee benefits. Ford employs
over 55,000 U.S. hourly employees.249 These employees are
241

See id. Also, failure on behalf of the employer to comply with the statute
bars the employer from raising the defense of third-party negligence, assumption
of risk, or the employee’s comparative negligence during a civil suit. See id.
§ 440.06.
242
Id. § 440.02 (17)(a)(2).
243
See id. § 440.02 (15)(d)(1)(a).
244
See id. § 440.14(1).
245
See id. § 440.15.
246
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, 2017,
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2017/workerscomp.html
(last visited May 15, 2021).
247
See Sharp, supra note 210.
248
Id.
249
See KELLI FELKER & TED O’NEIL, UAW-FORD, 2019 UAW-FORD
NEGOTIATIONS
MEDIA
FACT
GUIDE
4,
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represented through the United Automobile Workers (the “UAW”)
Union.250 In anticipation of upcoming renegotiations with the UAW,
Ford released a Media Fact Guide in 2019 that provides helpful insight into employee cost.251 At the time, Ford expected that the
healthcare cost alone for these employees would exceed $1 billion
by 2020.252 Ford explained that these employees pay no healthcare
premiums or deductibles and that across sectors, only 7% of U.S.
employees have the benefit of paying no deductible.253
Ford reported its Hourly Labor Costs (“HLC”)—the cost of labor including pay, cost of contractual benefits, and statutory payments like Social Security and workers’ compensation—at $54 per
hour.254 Ford calculated this average over four employee groups,
which included “Skilled Trades,” “Legacy,” “In-Progression,” and
“Temporary” employees.255 Ford reported that in 2018, Legacy employees made between $28 and $30 per hour,256 while In-Progression employees made between $17 and $30 per hour,257 and Temporary employees made between $15.78 and $19.28 per hour.258
Ford did not provide pay information for its Skilled Trades employees in the Media Fact Guide, but a 2015 Skilled Trades Agreement
between Ford and the UAW revealed these employees are paid between $29.26 and $34.02 per hour.259 For purposes of this Note, the
maximum pay range for each group was utilized and averaged to

https://media.ford.com/content/dam/fordmedia/North%20America/US/2019/07/uawford/uaw-ford-media-fact-guide.pdf.
250
Id.
251
See id. at 3–4.
252
See id. at 16.
253
Id.
254
Id. at 13. This number includes a net credit for Ford based on pension portfolio returns. Id. Ford reports that without this net credit, their HLC is $61 per
hour. Id.
255
Id. at 7.
256
Id. at 9.
257
Id. at 10. This range reflects the difference between starting and maximum
wage. Id.
258
Id. at 11. Ford did not provide pay information for its Skilled Trade employees, which makes up approximately 17% of its UAW workforce. Id. at 8.
259
See Skilled Trades Agreements and Letters of Understanding between
UAW and the Ford Motor Company 22 (Nov. 5, 2015), https://uaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/UAW-Ford-Skilled-Trades-digipubZ.pdf.
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$28.32 per hour.260 Subtracting the average pay to each employee
from Ford’s self-reported HLC of $54 yielded an additional employee benefit payment of $25.68 per hour.261 This represents a 47%
cost increase on Ford’s behalf based on employee status.262 Ford’s
benefit-cost encompasses more than just statutory obligations because of other negotiated terms between itself and the UAW.263 The
fact that these employees can unionize under the UAW, however, is
preceded by an employee designation under the NLRA, as discussed
above.264
In September 2019, the Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics (the “BLS”) provided a news release on the topic of employer compensation cost.265 The BLS reported that employee benefits account for approximately 31% of the employer’s cost.266 Employee compensation averaged $36.61 per hour, wherein $25.12 of
that was direct pay.267 Employers paid an additional $11.48 per hour
for employee benefits.268 The $11.48 benefit pay consisted of $2.64
for paid leave, $1.03 for supplemental pay (e.g., overtime and shift
pay), $3.19 for insurance benefits (where health insurance made up
a majority of the cost at $3.04), $1.94 for retirement and savings
plans, and $2.68 for statutory obligations.269 With these figures in
mind, what does it all mean for TNCs?

260
This calculation also assumes that each employee group comprises a quarter of Ford’s workforce, which is not the case. See FELKER & O’NEIL, supra note
249, at 8. This Note is only meant to provide a general overview and not an exact
employer-cost based on benefit obligations.
261
This calculation was performed by this Note’s author.
262
This calculation was performed by this Note’s author.
263
See FELKER & O’NEIL, supra note 249, at 7–22 (describing employee benefits, many of which have been negotiated with the UAW).
264
See supra Parts II.C & II.D.1.
265
News Release, Dep’t of Lab., Bureau of Lab. Stat., No. USDL-19-1649,
Employer Cost for Employee Compensation – June 2019 1 (Sept. 17, 2019) [hereinafter Dep’t of Lab. News Release], https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/ecec_09172019.pdf.
266
Id.
267
Id.
268
Id.
269
Id.
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B.
Statutory Obligations and TNC Discussion
At the end of 2018, Uber and Lyft had a combined five million
drivers on their platforms.270 This is significantly more than the
55,000 Ford employees discussed above, where employee benefits
represent approximately 47% of Ford’s cost.271 Even though Ford is
an extreme example of employee-benefit cost, the Department of
Labor reported an average cost increase of 31%.272 Rough estimates
based on the self-reported earnings of Uber and Lyft drivers previously discussed273 would place Uber’s HLC at $6.11274 and Lyft’s
HLC at $5.52.275 In total, this would represent an approximate increase of $23 million in HLC for Uber276 and $6 million for Lyft.277
Even if it is assumed that 100% of drivers work twenty hours per
week,278 this would represent a yearly cost of $6 billion for Lyft and
$23 billion for Uber.279 The increased operating costs are fatal to
Uber and Lyft’s business models.280 Uber reported 2018 revenue in
270

See Uber Techs., Inc., supra note 1, at 5; Lyft, Inc., supra note 15, at 2.
See supra notes 249 and 262 and accompanying text.
272
See Dep’t of Lab News Release, supra note 265, at 1.
273
See supra Part I.
274
This figure was calculated at the pre-expense average pay rate of $19.73 at
31% yielding a $6.11 HLC. It is important to note that the Ford calculations were
based on actual wages Ford paid its employees. Because Uber and Lyft do not in
the same sense pay its drivers, but rather take a commission of the fare, the calculated HLC here represents the best attempt on the available data.
275
This figure was calculated at the pre-expense average pay rate of $17.81 at
31% yielding a $5.52 Hourly Labor Cost.
276
This figure was calculated by multiplying the number of drivers Uber reported on its platform (3.9 million), Uber Techs., Inc., supra note 1, at 5, by the
$6.11 increase cost for employee benefits. See supra note 274 and accompanying
text.
277
This figure was calculated by multiplying the number of drivers Lyft reported on its platform (1.1 million), Lyft, Inc., supra note 15, at 2, by the $5.52
increase cost for employee benefits. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
278
Lyft, for example, reports that over 90% of its drivers work less than twenty
hours per week. LYFT, 2020 Economic Impact Report, supra note 28.
279
This increased operating cost assumes that all TNC drivers would be classified as employees.
280
These calculations are based on the assumption that five million drivers are
actively operating on Uber and Lyft’s platform at the rate of 20 hours per week
and that the employee-benefit cost would represent approximately 31% of driver
compensation, even though drivers are currently paid on commission and is the
only available data.
271
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the amount of $11 billion with an operating cost of $14 billion.281
Lyft reported a $2.2 billion 2018 revenue with a $3.1 billion operating cost.282
The increased operating cost based on employee classification is
enough for TNCs to seek alternative methods in which to become
more profitable by eliminating these costs. One way283 TNCs are
currently exploring reducing operating costs in the long term is
through heavily investing in autonomous driving research and development. If successful, TNCs will not have to worry about employee classifications because it will simply not have a need for drivers.284 Arguably, AB 5 and like legislation effectively incentivizes
TNCs to double-down on autonomous research and development
which will eliminate the estimated five million drivers that depend
on the gig economy for supplemental income. The final part of this
Note discusses the current state of autonomous driving research and
development by TNCs.
PROACTIVE INDUSTRY MEASURES AGAINST EMPLOYEE
DESIGNATION AND COVID-19’S IMPACT
In 2014, Uber’s then CEO, Travis Kalanick, stated “[t]he reason
Uber could be expensive is because you’re not just paying for the
car—you’re paying for the other dude in the car. When there’s no
other dude in the car, the cost of taking an Uber anywhere becomes
cheaper than owning a vehicle.”285 In 2015, Uber announced a
IV.

281
See Uber Techs., Inc., supra note 1, at F-4 app. (Consolidated Financial
Statements).
282
See Lyft, Inc., supra note 15, at F-4 app. (Consolidated Financial Statements).
283
This Note does not discuss any reactive measures that TNCs are likely to
take which could include: limiting work hours to less than forty hours per week
to avoid overtime pay, limiting work hours to avoid the accumulation of required
time for FMLA leave, and other work limitations to avoid triggering benefits under various state laws.
284
Of course, there is the possibility that legislative action could also curtail
the implementation of autonomous driving, a separate and distinct discussion not
at the center of this Note.
285
Mark Harris, Uber Could be First to Test Completely Driverless Cars in
Public, IEEE SPECTRUM (Sept. 14, 2015), https://spectrum.ieee.org/cars-thatthink/transportation/self-driving/uber-could-be-first-to-test-completely-driverless-cars-in-public.
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partnership with Carnegie Mellon University with the goal of developing autonomous driving capability.286 Since then, Uber has been
actively testing and developing autonomous capability except for a
nine-month halt after one of its autonomous vehicles struck and tragically killed Elaine Herzberg in Tempe, Arizona, on March 18,
2018.287 Less than a month after the incident, the current CEO of
Uber, Dan Khosrowshahi was interviewed and stated “we’re absolutely committed to self-driving cars” and that these vehicles “will
be safer than humans.”288
In 2018 alone, Uber invested $457 million in autonomous driving research and development and has since raised $1 billion
through private investors to continue funding the project.289 Lyft has
also ventured into the autonomous driving field, assigning 400 engineers to develop autonomous driving packages that it can install
in any vehicle.290 Lyft is also working on integrating other autonomous vehicle companies into its on-demand ride-hailing platform.291
286
Uber and CMU Announce Strategic Partnership and Advanced Technologies Center, UBER BLOG (Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.uber.com/blog/uber-andcmu-announce-strategic-partnership-and-advanced-technologies-center/.
287
See Carolyn Said, Uber Puts the Brakes on Testing Robot Cars in California after Arizona Fatality, S.F. CHRON. (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Uber-pulls-out-of-all-self-driving-car-testing-in12785490.php; Sean O’Kane, Uber Debuts a New Self-Driving Car With More
Fail-Safes, VERGE (June 12, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/
6/12/18662626/uber-volvo-self-driving-car-safety-autonomous-factory-level;
Troy Griggs & Daisuke Wakabayashi, How a Self-Driving Uber Killed a Pedestrian in Arizona, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/03/20/us/self-driving-uber-pedestrian-killed.html.
288
NBC News, Uber CEO Dara Khosrowshahi: ‘We’re Absolutely Committed to Self-Driving Cars’, TODAY (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.today.com/video/uber-ceo-dara-khosrowshahi-we-re-absolutely-committed-toself-driving-cars-1209073731757.
289
Alison Griswold, Uber Raised $1 Billion for Self-Driving Cars Because It
Desperately Needs the Money, QUARTZ (Apr. 19, 2019), https://qz.com/
1599134/uber-secures-much-needed-1-billion-investment-for-self-driving-carsunit/.
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Lora Kolodny et al., Take a Peek Inside Lyft’s Lab Where 400 Engineers
are Working on Self-Driving Cars, CNBC (Nov. 5, 2019), https://
www.cnbc.com/2019/11/05/lyft-is-developing-self-driving-cars-at-its-level-5lab-in-palo-alto.html.
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Even though Uber foresees autonomous vehicle integration as a
long-term goal, the only obstacle at the moment is likely the technological restraint.292 With legislation like AB 5 and other similar policy objectives, TNCs are likely incentivized to raise and increase
funding for research and development into autonomous vehicles.
AB 5 does not only threaten TNCs based on the prohibitive cost
that it would impose, but it also threatens TNCs’ ability to retain
their driver base. This is because one-third of drivers cite flexibility
as the main reason that they drive for TNCs in the first place.293 During the COVID-19 pandemic, 80,000 drivers were solicited for a
poll and 734 responses were received.294 Over 70% of drivers desired to maintain an independent contractor status.295 An employee
classification could simply reduce the number of drivers willing to
operate under a set schedule that TNCs would have to develop or
implement in some way. In fact, Uber discusses the importance of
driver retention as a risk factor in its S-1 filing:
Our success in a given geographic market significantly depends on our ability to maintain or increase
our network scale and liquidity in that geographic
market by attracting Drivers, consumers, restaurants,
shippers, and carriers to our platform. If Drivers
choose not to offer their services through our platform, or elect to offer them through a competitor’s
platform, we may lack a sufficient supply of Drivers
to attract consumers and restaurants to our platform.
We have experienced and expect to continue to experience Driver supply constraints in most geographic markets in which we operate.296
Alternatively, employee classification could lead TNCs to reduce the number of drivers on their respective platforms in jurisdictions that recognize drivers as such or eliminate service altogether.
292

Uber Techs., Inc., supra note 1, at 10.
CAMPBELL, supra note 31, at 4.
294
See Campbell, supra note 46.
295
Id. This reflected a 10% decrease from a pre-COVID-19 poll which
showed 81% were in favor of retaining an independent contractor status. Id.
296
Uber Techs., Inc., supra note 1, at 29; Lyft discusses the same in its S-1
filing. See Lyft, Inc., supra note 15, at 23.
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As a matter of fact, Uber and Lyft were on the verge of significantly
reducing their California operations as a result of a state court ruling
ordering them to comply with AB 5.297 This would further disserve
local communities that are already economically disadvantaged and
depend on these services for transportation.298 In fact, commentators
have discussed the positive impact that ride-hailing services have
had in economically depressed communities that have little to no
access to alternative transportation.299 Although the majority of this
Note was written pre-COVID-19, we have seen many of the proactive measures discussed above deployed in response to market and
legislative forces during the pandemic.
The seemingly endless COVID-19 pandemic continues to dominate the news daily. When the story is not directly centered on the
latest infection numbers or tragic death count, headlines on the economic impact follow.300 The pandemic has placed center stage the
TNC driver classification debate for obvious reasons.301 On one
hand, states are incentivized to ensure their constituents have access
to paid sick leave and healthcare.302 This, they hope, would allow
drivers not to have to choose between earning pay and their
health.303 On the other hand, lockstep with several other businesses,
Uber and Lyft have dramatically cut their employee workforce.304
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The independent contractor designation has spared drivers from the
same fate.305
By mid-May 2020, Uber decided to cut approximately 6,700
jobs and close several offices.306 This accounted for almost a quarter
of Uber’s employee workforce.307 Lyft has also scaled back its
workforce by approximately 17%.308 In April 2019, Uber saw an
80% decrease on its ridesharing platform due to the pandemic.309
The cutbacks, therefore, come as no surprise. Uber also recently announced it would be scaling back its autonomous vehicle program
as a cost-saving initiative.310 Lyft, however, restarted its program in
late June 2020.311
Additionally, in May, California sued Uber and Lyft under the
implementation of AB 5, seeking millions in civil penalties and unpaid wages.312 Uber responded by citing the four million California
workers currently unemployed and argued such policy would make
employment opportunities harder to come across.313 Uber and Lyft
have maintained that an employee classification would result in decreased ridesharing operations in such areas.314
Massachusetts launched its own lawsuit against Uber and Lyft
in July 2020, similarly arguing that TNCs have been misclassifying
their drivers.315 Instead of passing legislation like California, Massachusetts appears to be taking the debate to the courts under the
common-law agency test, alluding to the control factor discussed

305

See generally id.
Id.
307
Id.
308
Sebastian Herrera & Tim Higgins, California Sues Uber, Lyft Saying They
Misclassified Drivers as Independent Contractors, WALL ST. J. (May 5, 2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/california-to-sue-uber-lyft-saying-they-misclassified-drivers-as-independent-contractors-11588700626.
309
See Rana, Uber Cuts, supra note 301.
310
Id.
311
See Kristen Korosec, Lyft’s Self-Driving Test Vehicles Are Back on Public
Roads in California, TECHCRUNCH (Jun. 30, 2020), https://techcrunch.com/
2020/06/30/lyfts-self-driving-test-vehicles-are-back-on-public-roads-in-california/.
312
Herrera & Higgins, supra note 308.
313
Id.
314
Id.
315
Hawkins, supra note 302.
306

2021]

THE STATUTORY DEATH OF THE GIG ECONOMY

993

above.316 Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healey stated
“Uber and Lyft set the rates. They alone set the rules. Drivers are
employees.”317 Like its response to California, Uber cited the threat
the lawsuit posed to the 50,000 Massachusettsans on its platform
who could find themselves out of supplemental income.318
In their response to California and Massachusetts, Uber and Lyft
point to the “pragmatic effect” such designation would have on its
platform and drivers.319 Although investment in autonomous research may have been scaled back, Lyft’s renewed research demonstrates that autonomous capability is a key goal of TNCs.320 Even
though Proposition 22 has now exempted Uber and Lyft from
AB 5’s grasp, TNCs have significant upcoming legal battles to face.
On May 2, 2019, the U.S. House of Representatives introduced the
Protecting the Right to Organize Act (the “PRO Act”).321 Section
4(a)(2) of the PRO Act would amend the NLRA by adopting the
statutory presumption of employer-employee along with the “ABC”
test and would abrogate the NLRB’s SuperShuttle classification
test.322 Like AB 5, the prospects of federal oversight on this front
more than sufficiently incentivizes TNCs to avoid the issue altogether and automate a majority of their workforce.
CONCLUSION
This Note has reviewed available data on TNC driver demographics and, though limited, has indicated that a majority of
drivers engage these ride-hailing platforms as part of the gig economy, seeking supplementary rather than primary sources of income.
Further, the discussion on various legal approaches taken by courts
316
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and administrations on employee classification has revealed wide
inconsistencies. Even though all of these approaches apply the same
or variations of the common-law agency test, they end up with varying classifications on similar facts. This discrepancy is best attributable to the lens in which each authority is applying the common-law agency test. This Note has discussed in depth three of these
lenses: (1) the “remedial statutory purpose” lens seen in California
through Borello, Dynamex, and AB 5; (2) the “party-intent” lens
seen in Florida through Keith and Kendall; and (3) the “entrepreneurial opportunity” lens applied by the NLRB but not exclusive in
all federal matters.
While providing a broad look at statutory obligations at the federal level to include ERISA, FICA, FMLA, FLSA, and state-level
obligations like workers’ compensation and unemployment benefit,
this Note took a cursory look at costs associated with such obligations, concluding an approximate 31% HLC increase upon employee classification. Applying this cost to the TNC business model,
the prohibitive nature of such classification was realized. Even
though employee classification may not be the direct motivating factor in which TNCs have invested heavily in autonomous vehicle development, policies like AB 5 and the PRO Act surely incentivize
TNCs to continue to research and develop this technology as quickly
as possible. TNCs’ commitment to autonomous research has (seemingly) survived the COVID-19 pandemic as TNCs continue to cut
costs.
With five million drivers on TNC platforms, policies like AB 5
and the PRO Act could end up hurting these gig economy drivers in
the long run, foreclosing the opportunity to generate supplemental
income. COVID-19 has spurned additional attacks on TNCs in Massachusetts, and additional states may follow suit. Because of this
very real threat, legislators and reviewing authorities should also
take a hard look at the employee classification issue through the lens
of the “pragmatic effect” that such policy consequences will have
on the gig economy. The “pragmatic effect” principle should look
at how gig economy industries necessarily depend on the independent contractor status at inception and also how an employee classification could result in the industry’s destruction. This is especially
true at a time where economic recovery in the post-COVID market
will depend on the ability of workers generating supplemental
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income as many traditional employers reevaluate and adjust their
market strategy.

